ABSTRACT Today, data is exploding. A large amount of data needs to be processed in a timely and an efficient manner. Aggregate signatures are an efficient and secure way to handle large numbers of digital signatures. In an aggregate signature scheme, n signatures on n messages from n users can be combined into a single signature, which can make anyone believes that the n messages were indeed signed by the n corresponding users. In the recent decade, numerous certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) schemes have been introduced. In most CLAS schemes currently known, the number of hash-to-point operations and the size of signature increase linearly with the number of signers, so they are not suitable for computing restricted devices, such as mobile devices. In this paper, a new CLAS scheme is constructed, which requires only two pairing operations and the signature contains only one point and state information. It is more efficient than the previous ones and suit for the mobile devices.
an increase of 3.8% over 2017. The proportion of Internet users using mobile phones in China is 98.6%. In 2018, the number of new mobile Internet users was 64.33 million, and the number of mobile Internet users reached 187 million, accounting for 98.6% of the size of China's online users. In 2017, this ratio was 97.5%. In 2018, the average online time for online users in China was 27.6 hours per week, 0.6 hours higher than in 2017. This also means that the average online time per person in 2018 is 4 hours.
In traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), the user chooses his own private key and sets the corresponding public key which is bundled with the user by a digital certificate issued by a trusted certification authority (CA). To manage the certificates, a lots of resources is consumed. To reduce costs, Shamir [21] introduced identity-based public key cryptography. In this setting, the user's private key is generated by a trusted private key generator (PKG) through the user's public key which is a string (e.g. user's identity card number or email address), since PKG controls all the private keys, it can harm to any user. To solve the two problems, Al-Riyami et al. [1] put forward certificateless public key cryptography. In this notion, a user's full private key includes two parts: a secret value chosen by himself and a partial private key issued by a semi-trusted key generation center (KGC) according to user's identity.
In 2001, Boneh et al. [2] presented short signature. The length of the signature is much smaller than that of the general signature. In 2003, Boneh et al. [3] put forward aggregate signature, n signatures on n messages from n users can be combine into a single signature. Verifying the resulting signature, anyone believes that the n messages were indeed signed by the n corresponding users. With the rapid growth of various data, how to process data safely and efficiently becomes an urgent problem to be solved. The CLAS scheme has the advantages of certificateless cryptography and aggregate signature, which has attracted the attention of researchers. In most CLAS schemes currently known, the number of hashto-point operations and the size of the signature increase linearly with the number of signers, which requires the user to have strong computing and storage capabilities. In order to be portable, the size of the mobile device is relatively small, and the computing and storage capabilities are limited. Therefore, these CLAS solutions are not suitable for mobile devices. It is very meaningful to design an efficient and secure CLAS scheme for mobile devices.
A. RELATED WORK
Huang et al. [13] put forward the first certificateless short signature (CLSS) scheme and gave the security proofs. However, Shim [20] indicated that the scheme [13] is insecure against the type I adversary. Du and Wen [11] proposed a CLSS scheme and showed the security proofs. However, Choi et al. [7] demonstrated that the scheme [11] is vulnerable against the strong Type I adversary and constructed a new CLSS scheme. However, Tian et al. [25] pointed out that the scheme [7] is still insecure and a strong Type I adversary can forge a signature. Tso et al. [23] presented a CLSS scheme and showed the security proofs based on k − CAA (the collusion attack algorithm with k traitors) problem. Tso et al. [24] constructed another CLSS scheme and gave the security proofs in a weak secure model, where the attacker was not allowed to query the secret value of the challenge user. He et al. [14] put forward a CLSS scheme requiring hash-to-point operations. Tsai [26] proposed a CLSS scheme requiring only one pairing operation. Deng et al. [9] constructed a new CLSS scheme and showed the security proofs in the standard model. Many CLAS schemes have been given in the past 12 years. Castro and Dahab [4] designed the first CLAS scheme. Gong et al. [12] put forward two CLAS schemes and gave the security proofs in a weak model. In order to improve computing efficiency, Zhang and Zhang [30] , Zhang et al. [29] and Nie et al. [19] put forward a CLAS scheme, respectively. In the three schemes, the signers need to share synchronized clocks to generate an aggregate signature. Xiong et al. [27] constructed a new CLAS scheme, which requires only three pairing operations. He et al. [15] pointed out that the scheme [27] is insecure and presented an improved scheme. However, Li et al. [18] showed that a malicious-but-passive KGC can forge a valid signature in the scheme [15] . Zhang et al. [31] indicated that the scheme [27] is vulnerable by showing four kinds of concrete attacks, then presented a new CLAS scheme. Cheng et al. [6] showed that the scheme [27] is vulnerable against the ''honest-but-curious'' KGC, and put forward a reformative scheme. Chen et al. [5] constructed a CLAS scheme with a constant number of pairing operations. However, Shen et al. [22] pointed out that the scheme [5] is vulnerable. Deng et al. [8] proposed a new CLAS scheme with a constant number of pairing operations. Deng et al. [10] constructed another CLAS scheme and gave the security proofs based on RSA and discrete logarithm problem. Kumar et al. [17] proposed a CLAS scheme and gave the security proofs. However, Xie et al. [28] indicated that the scheme [17] is vulnerable and presented a new CLAS scheme without pairing operations.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In all known CLAS schemes, the number of hash-to-point operations increase linearly with the number of signers. In most CLAS schemes, the size of signature increase linearly with the number of signers. These schemes require that the devices in the network have strong computing and storage capabilities. Due to the size constraints, the computing and storage capabilities of mobile devices are limited. So these schemes are not suit for mobile devices. Therefore, it is quite significant to constructed an efficient and secure CLAS scheme for mobile devices.
In this paper, a new CLAS scheme is constructed that has the following features:
• It is proved to be secure under the assumption that it is hard to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
• It requires only 2 pairing operations, independent of the number of signers.
• The size of signature is a point and a state information, independent of the number of signers. 
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the definition of bilinear pairing and computational Diffie-Hellman problem is first given, then the system model and security requirements of the CLAS scheme are introduced. The notations used throughout the paper are listed in Table 1 .
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Letê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 be a map with the following properties.
Where
is an additive group with prime order q and G 2 be a multiplicative group with the same order.
• Bilinearity:ê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z q .
• Non-degeneracy: There exist P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1 G 2 .
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 . Definition 1: Computation Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. For P ∈ G 1 , given a tuple (aP, bP), compute abP.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
A certificateless aggregate signature scheme ( Fig.1) consists of the following seven algorithms:
• Setup: On input a security parameter ν, this algorithm outputs params (system parameters) and msk (master secret key).
• PPK-Extract: On input an identity ID i ∈ {0, 1} * , this algorithm outputs the partial private key D i .
• SV-Set: On input an identity ID i , this algorithm outputs the secret value SV i .
• UPK-Set: On input an identity ID i , this algorithm outputs the public key PK i .
• Sign: On input a tuple ( , m, SV i , D i ), this algorithm outputs a signature σ .
• Aggregate: On input a tuple ( , σ 1 , · · · , σ n , M , A), this algorithm outputs an aggregate signature σ .
• Agg-verify: On input a tuple (σ, M , A), this algorithm outputs 1 or 0.
Remark: In order to shorten the length of the signature, all users must use the same state information when signing. Where be the current time parameter, or other information which all users have shared.
C. SECURITY MODEL
Definition 2: A CLAS scheme is unforgeable (UNF-CLAS) if the advantage of any adversary is negligible in the following two games.
Game I. The first game is carried out between a challenger C and a Type I adversary A 1 .
Initialization. C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain msk and params. C keeps msk secret and gives params to A 1 .
Query. A 1 executes a polynomially bounded number of queries.
• Hash-Query: A 1 can query the values of the hash functions for any input.
• UPK-Query: A 1 inputs an identity ID i , C returns a value PK i .
• UPK-Replace: A 1 inputs a tuple (PK i , ID i ), C replaces PK i with PK i .
• PPK-Query: A 1 inputs an identity ID i , C returns a value D i . A 1 cannot do it if R i or S i has been replaced.
• SV-Query: A 1 inputs an identity ID i , C returns a value SV i . A 1 cannot do it if T i or X i has been replaced.
• Sig-Query: 
III. NEW SCHEME
In this section, a new CLAS scheme is proposed as follows.
• Setup: Given the security parameter ν, KGC does as follows.
1) Chooses a bilinear pairingê
Where G 1 and G 2 are two group with prime order q > 2 ν , P is a generator of G 1 . 2) Chooses four cryptographic hash functions
q , computes P pub = λP, sets master secret key msk = {λ}. 4) Broadcasts the public parameters: params = {G 1 , G 2 , q,ê, P, P pub , H 1 ∼ H 4 }.
• PPK-Extract: For a user ID i ∈ {0, 1} * , KGC randomly chooses two different numbers r i , s i ∈ Z * q , computes
to the user ID i via a secure channel.
• SV-Set: The user ID i randomly chooses two different numbers t i , x i ∈ Z * q .
• UPK-Set: The user ID i computes T i = t i P, X i = x i P and sets
• Sign: For a message m i ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer ID i first chooses a one-time-use state information , then performs the following steps:
and outputs
σ i as the signature.
• Aggregate: On input a tuple ( , σ 1 , · · · , σ n , M , A), anyone computes σ = n i=1 σ i and outputs a signature (σ, , M , A).
• Agg-verify: On receive a tuple (σ, , M , A), the verifier performs the following steps:
holds, accepts the signature. Otherwise, rejects.
• On correctnesŝ e(σ, P)
IV. SECURITY
In this section, the proposed CLAS scheme is proved to be unforgeable in the random oracle model(ROM). Theorem 1: In ROM, the scheme is unforgeable against the Type I adversary if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof: Suppose that the challenger C receives a tuple (P, aP, bP) with the purpose of computing abP, C will act as A 1 's challenger in the Game I.
Initialization. C runs the Setup program with the parameter ν, then gives A 1 the params = {G 1 , G 2 , q,ê, P, P pub = λP,
Queries. A 1 will perform UPK-Query before an identity ID i is used in any other queries. Several lists are set to store the queries and answers. All the lists are initially empty.
• UPK-Query: C maintains a list L U of tuple (ID i , t i , x i , r i , s i ). A 1 inputs an identity ID i , C responds as follows:
and returns PK i = (t i P, x i P, r i P, s i P), then adds
• H 1 -Query: C maintains a list L 1 of tuple (α i , l i ).
A 1 issues a query H 1 (α i ), C randomly picks l i ∈ Z * q , sets H 1 (α i ) = l i and adds (α i , l i ) to the list L 1 .
• H 2 -Query: C maintains a list L 2 of tuple (β i , h i ).
A 1 issues a query H 2 (β i ), C randomly picks h i ∈ Z * q , sets H 1 (β i ) = h i and adds (β i , h i ) to the list L 2 .
• H 3 -Query: C maintains a list L 3 of tuple (β i , k i ). When A 1 issues a query H 3 (β i ), C randomly picks k i ∈ Z * q , sets H 3 (β i ) = k i and adds (β i , k i ) to the list L 3 .
• H 4 -Query: C maintains a list L 4 of tuple ( i , µ i , δ i ). • UPK-Replace: C maintains a list L R of tuple (ID i , PK i , PK i ). A 1 inputs a tuple (ID i , PK i ), C replaces PK i with PK i and adds (ID i , PK i , PK i ) to the list L R .
• PPK-Query: 
the list L 4 . If µ i = 0, C fails and stops. Otherwise, C does as follow: 
Therefore, if A 1 can forge a aggregate signature with probability , then C can solve the CDH problem with probability
In ROM, the scheme is unforgeable against the Type II adversary if the CDH problem is hard.
Proof: Suppose that the challenger C receives a tuple (P, aP, bP) with the purpose of computing abP, C will act as A 2 's challenger in the Game II.
Initialization. C runs the Setup program with the parameter ν, then gives A 2 the params = {G 1 , G 2 , q,ê, P, P pub = λP, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 } and msk = {λ}. Queries. A 2 will perform UPK-Query before an identity ID i is used in any other queries. Several lists are set to store the queries and answers. All the lists are initially empty.
• UPK-Query: C maintains a list L U of tuple (ID i , t i , x i , r i , s i ). A 2 inputs a user ID i , C responds as follows:
• H i -Query(i = 1, 2, 3, 4): Same as those in the proof of Theorem 1.
• UPK-Replace: Same as that in the proof of Theorem 1.
• SV-Query:
• Sig-Query: Same as that in the proof of Theorem 1. Forge. A 2 outputs a tuple (σ * , * , M * , A * ) that fulfills the requirements as defined in the Game II.
Solve CDH problem. By the proposed scheme, it follows that σ * = n i=1 σ * i , σ * i is a signature on the message m * i with the state information * under ID * i /PK * i for i = 1, · · · , n. There is an identity ID * j ∈ W * for which A 2 did not perform SV-Query or replace T j or X j , which implies that σ * j is a forge signature on the message m * j . After replaying A 2 with the same random tape but different k * j returned by query H 3 (m * j , ID * j , PK * j , * ), C get two valid signatures σ * and σ * , where 1, 2, 3, 4) , q U , q R , q E and q S be the number of H i -Query (i = 1,2,3), UPK-Query, UPK-Replace, SV-Query, Sig-Query respectively. Due to A 2 cannot perform SV-Query for ID i if T i or X i has been replaced, it is an reasonable assumption that L E L R = ∅. Several events are defined as follows:
π 1 : C does not fail during the SV-Query. π 2 : C does not fail during the Sig-Query. π 3 : ID j = ID * and µ * = 0. It is easy to get following results: 
Therefore, if A 2 can forge a aggregate signature with probability , then C can solve the CDH problem with probability
V. EFFICIENCY
In this section, performance comparisons are made between the new scheme and four CLAS schemes from the last five years. Several notations are defined as follows. [16] obtained the time overhead on basic cryptographic operations (Table 2) by using the cryptographic library(MIRACL) and performing the operations on a mobile phone (Samsung Galaxy S5 with the Google Android 4.4.2 operating system, a Quad-core 2.45G processor and 2G bytes memory),
The security level is set to 1024-bit RSA security in the experiments. A Tate pairingê :
where G 1 is an additive group with q order, which is defined on a super singular curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + 1, where the sizes of q and p are 160 bits and 512 bits, respectively.
A simple and intuitive method is adopted to estimate the computation costs. In order to facilitate comparison, it is assumed that there are n signers in an aggregate signature and n = 1000. Follow on, the size of signature are computed. In these three schemes [6] , [8] , [18] , each signature contains n + 1 points in G 1 , thus the signature size is (512 × 1001)/8 = 64064 bytes. In the schemes [19] , each signature contains 2 points in G 1 and 2 state information, thus the signature size is (512×2+160×2)/8 = 168 bytes. In the new scheme, each signature contains 1 points in G 1 and 1 state information, thus the signature size is (512 + 160)/8 = 84 bytes.
The detailed comparison results of several different CLAS schemes are illustrated in Table 3 (Fig.2) .
VI. CONCLUSION
With the widespread use of mobile communication devices, various data are exploding. How to process this data efficiently and safely becomes an urgent problem to be solved. Aggregate signature reduces computation burden and storage burden, which is applied to some actual scenarios, such VOLUME 7, 2019 as electronic trade, electronic monitoring. In most CLAS schemes currently known, the number of hash-to-point operations and the size of signature increase linearly with the number of signers, so they are not suitable for mobile devices. In this paper, a new CLAS scheme is proposed which is unforgeable against the type I/II adversaries in the random oracle model. The scheme requires only 2 pairing operations, the size of signature is one point in G 1 and a state information. They are independent of the number of signers. The scheme reduces computational costs and storage costs, so it is suit for mobile devices.
